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Abstract: Accounting scandals and bankruptcies across the world have raised concerns about the 
financial statement audit quality. Though, prior results documented mixed results, some argue that 
auditors become more familiar with the client and therefore independence is impaired when audit 
firm tenure gets longer. Consequently, some regulators set a limit on the number of years an audit 
firm may audit the same client. This study examines the association between audit firm tenure and 
audit quality in Turkey. We used three measures to proxy audit quality such as propensity to issue 
modified audit reports and discretionary accruals determined by two models. We found some 
evidence that audit quality does not increase with limited audit firm tenure. Given the additional costs 
associated with audit switch, it is concluded that there are minimal benefits of mandatory firm 
rotation. The results of this study will be useful for the regulators who are in charge to improve the 
audit quality.  
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1. Introduction 
Mandatory rotation of audit firm or partner becomes a controversial subject after 
the accounting and auditing scandals in the world such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Parmalat, Xerox, Tyco, Adelphia, Health South, Royal Ahold NV et cetera. 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 considered audit firm tenure as a potential area that 
needed to be investigated because the consecutive years of auditor-client 
relationship has the potential to impair auditor independence. There are increasing 
calls for audit committees to consider voluntary firm rotation as a means of 
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enhancing audit quality1. These calls for voluntary audit firm rotation presuppose 
that audit quality increases when a new audit firm is retained. Several countries 
currently have mandatory audit firm rotation regulation. Italy has required audit 
firm rotation since 1975, Brazil since 1999, and Singapore has required audit firm 
rotation for local banks since 2002. Numerous other countries including Austria, 
Canada, Greece, Spain and Slovakia previously required mandatory audit firm 
rotation (Corbella et al., 2015). In December 2012, the Netherlands issued the 
Dutch Audit Profession Act, limiting audit firm tenure to eight-year effective from 
1 January 2016. Furthermore, according to rules published in the Offical Journal of 
the European Union, listed companies, banks, and insurance companies must 
change their audit firms after 10 years (EU Regulation, No: 537/2014). This period 
can be extended to 20 years if the audit is put out for bid, or 24 years in instances 
of joint audits. Some argue that the quality of audits increase when a newly 
appointed auditor with fresh and skeptical eyes evaluates the financial statements. 
Assigning the same personnel on a same audit client over a long period of time 
believed to impair independence because of self-interest and familiarity threats 
(Eilifsen, Messier, Glover & Prawit, 2010). This research paper seeks some 
evidence whether long audit firm tenure give rise to decreases in audit quality.  
In Turkey, a policy of mandatory firm tenure is in place. According to the new 
Independent Audit Communiqué issued in December 2012 by Turkish Public 
Oversight Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority (POA), in an audit of the 
public interest entity, a firm shall not be the auditor for more than seven years for 
the last ten years (Official Gazette, 25809). In the cooling-off period the firm shall 
not participate in the audit of the entity, provide quality control for the engagement, 
consult with the engagement team or the client regarding technical or industry-
specific issues, transactions or events, or otherwise directly influence the outcome 
of the engagement. Therefore, an empirical evaluation should be undertaken 
whether this policy is beneficial.  
This study examines if there is a change in audit quality associated with firm 
tenure. We used three measures to proxy audit quality such as propensity to issue 
modified audit reports and discretionary accruals determined by two models. We 
traced the length of firm tenure for all listed companies in Turkey for 2014.  
Our findings show that audit quality does not increase when audit firm tenure is 
limited. This result does not support recent legislations requiring mandatory audit 
firm rotation in Turkey. We propose that other precautions such as quality control 
activities by the oversight board may need to be considered to overcome concerns 
about audit quality. We expect that, the findings of this study contributes the 
regulation of the (POA) with regard to audit-firm rotation.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines previous 
research. Section 3 presents research model and data. This is followed by the 
results for each of the three audit-quality measures in Section 4. Conclusions, 
limitations and contributions are presented in final section of the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Prior studies have documented mixed results between audit tenure and audit quality 
relationship. Carey and Simnett (2006) investigated Australian companies and 
found evidence of decreased audit quality measured by the auditor’s propensity to 
issue a going-concern audit opinion and just meeting (missing) earnings 
benchmarks, associated with long partner tenure. They also show that decrease in 
audit quality belongs to non-Big 6 auditors. Junaidi et al. (2012) show that the 
length of relationship between auditors and clients has a significantly negative 
effect on the propensity to issue going-concern opinions. Machida and Hayashi 
(2012) found that audit quality is reduced in cases of long term audit tenure. In 
addition, they do not find significant difference between audit partner rotation and 
audit firm rotation when evaluated based on going-concern opinions. Mgbame et al 
(2012) investigates the association between the tenure of an auditor and audit 
quality. Their analysis show that there is a negative relationship between auditor 
tenure and audit quality. Chi and Huang (2005) examines how audit tenure affects 
earnings quality by investigating the effect of audit-firm and audit-partner tenure 
on the level of discretionary accruals. They find that familiarity helps to produce 
higher earnings quality, but excessive familiarity results in lower earnings quality. 
They argue that the cut-off point of the positive and negative effects of familiarity 
is nearly five years.  
On the other hand, Johnson et al. (2002) find that relative to medium audit-tenures 
of four to eight years, short audit-firm tenures of two to three years are associated 
with lower –quality financial reports. In contrast, they found no evidence of 
reduced financial- reporting quality for longer audit-firm tenures of nine or more 
years. Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) investgated the relationship between audit 
tenure and auditing failures. Their result indicate that there were significantly more 
audit reporting failures in the earlier years of the auditor-client relationship than 
when auditors had served these clients for longer tenures. Manry et al. (2008) 
found evidence that for small companies, regardless of the level of engagement 
risk, audit quality actually may increase as audit partner tenure increases. They 
found no significant relationship between partner tenure and audit quality for large 
low-risk or high-risk companies or for smaller companies with shorter tenure. 
Myers et al. (2003) examine the relationship between audit tenure and audit 
quality. They used discretionary accruals and the current accruals to proxy for audit 
quality. They found that auditors place greater constraints on both income 
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increasing and income decreasing accruals as the audit tenure lengthens. Their 
findings show that audit quality does impair with tenure. In addition, Carcello and 
Nagy (2004) examined the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent 
financial reporting. They found no evidence that audit quality increases when a 
new audit firm is retained. Rather, they found that fraudulent financial reporting is 
more likely when auditor tenure is three years or less. Ghosh and Moon (2005) 
examined perceptions of investors, independent rating agencies, and financial 
analysts on the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. They found 
positive association between investor perceptions of earnings quality and tenure. 
They document that investors and information intermediaries perceive auditor 
tenure as improving audit quality. Jackson et al (2008) find that when audit quality 
is measured by propensity to issue a going-concern opinion, audit firm tenure has 
positive effect on audit quality. They also find that audit quality is unaffected when 
measured by discretionary expenses. George (2009) investigated the effect of the 
auditor-client consecutive years of relationship on financial reporting quality. He 
found that the financial statement fraud is most likely to occur in the initial years of 
auditor engagement. The longer audit firm tenure is associated with lower 
probability of fraudulent financial reporting. Rohami et al (2009) examined the 
relationship between audit firm tenure and audit reporting quality in Malaysia. 
They found a positive relationship between audit firm tenure and audit reporting 
quality. Knechel and Ann Vanstraelen (2007) investigated the relationship between 
auditor tenure and audit quality for Belgium companies. They used the propensity 
to issue a going concern opinion as a measure of audit quality. Using a sample of 
stressed bankrupt companies, and stressed non-bankrupt companies, their findings 
reveal that auditors do not become less independent over time nor do they become 
better at predicting bankruptcy. Krauss et al (2014) found that audit engagement 
tenure wouldn’t be a significant factor with regard to audit quality for a 
comparative sample of firm observations from Germany and the United States.  
 
3. Research Model and Data 
In this study, we search for a possible association between audit firm tenure and 
audit quality. To examine this relationship, we use two models of discretionary 
accruals and propensity to issue modified (emphasis of matter paragraph for going 
concern, qualified, adverse, and disclaimer) audit opinions as a measure of audit 
quality. A substantial body of prior research used discretionary accruals and going 
concern opinions as proxies for audit quality (Manry, Mock & Tunner, 2008; Chan, 
Lin & Lin, 2008; Jackson, Moldrich & Roebuck, 2008; Carey & Simnett, 2006, 
Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007). 
First, the cross-sectional version of modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney, 1995) is used to estimate discretionary accruals. However, due to the fact 
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that performance-matched discretionary accrual measures enhance the reliability of 
the inferences from earnings management research (Kothari, Leone & Wasley 
2005), we control for the company’s prior performance and measure discretionary 
accruals (DA) as follows: 
D𝐴𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 −  [∅1 (1/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 ) + ∅2 (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 −  𝐴𝑅𝑡) + ∅3 +  ∅4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 ] 
Where; 
TACt  = Total accruals (earnings before extraordinary items 
minus net cash flow from operations) 
TAt-1 = Total assets 
∆SALESt  = Change in net sales 
∆ARt   = Change in net accounts receivable 
PPEt    = Net property, plant, and equipment 
ROA   = The rate of return on total assets 
t   = The event period 
TACt, ∆ SALESt, ∆ARt, and PPEt are scaled by lagged total assets, TAt-1. The 
coefficients, ø1, ø2, ø3, and ø4 are the parameters from estimating the following 
model by industry-year, consistent with Chan, Lin, Lin, 2008. 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 =  ∅1 (1/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 ) +  ∅2 (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 −  𝐴𝑅𝑡) +  ∅3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 +  ∅4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 +  Ɛ𝑡 
Second, we used Larcker and Richardson (2004) model of discretionary accruals. 
This model adds book-to-market ratio (BM) as a proxy of expected growth in the 
operations of firms and cash flows from operations (CFO) to avoid the effect of 
extreme firm performance on accruals since the Modified Jones Model determine 
wrongly discretionary accruals in extreme firm performance. The Larcker and 
Richardson Model is as follows; 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑡 =  ∅0 +  ∅1 (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 −  𝐴𝑅𝑡) / TAt−1 + ∅2 PPEt/ TAt−1  
+  ∅3 CFOt / TAt−1  +  ∅4 BMt  +  Ɛt 
Where: 
TACt  = Total accruals (earnings before extraordinary items 
minus net cash  flow from operations) 
 
TAt-1  =Total assets 
∆SALESt  = Change in net sales 
∆ARt   = Change in net accounts receivable 
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PPEt   = Net property, plant, and equipment 
CFOt  = Cash flows from operations in the period 
BMt   = Book to Market ratio in the period 
t   = The event period 
We test the association between DA and audit firm tenure with the following 
regression equation; 
DA =  β0 +  β1 FT +   β2 BIG4 +  β3 OPINION  +  β4 SIZE Ɛt 
FT  = Audit firm tenure 
BIG4         = a dummy variable equal to 0 if the company is 
audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 1 otherwise 
OPINION      = a dummy variable equal to 0 if the auditor’s 
opinion is unqualified  opinion and 1 otherwise 
SIZE       = logarithm of year-end book value of total assets 
Third, we use auditor’s propensity to issue a modified opinion in order to measure 
audit quality. We control some variables that influence the modified audit opinions. 
If the probability of issuing modified audit reports is inversely related to long audit 
firm tenure, this shows that long firm tenure impairs audit quality. The following 
logistic regression model estimates the auditor’s probability of issuing a modified 
opinion: 
OPINION =  β0 +  β1 BIG4 +   β2 FT +  β3 SIZE  +  Ɛt 
The data for this study is collected from the published financial statements and 
audit reports of non-financial companies listed on the Borsa Istanbul in 2014. For 
sample companies we trace back the audit reports to get firm tenure and modified 
audit reports. Excluding non-financial companies and companies with missing 
data, the sample results in an observation of 234 Turkish listed companies.  
 
4. Results 
Table 1 presents the results of Modified Jones Model estimating the relationship 
between discretionary accruals (a proxy for audit quality) and audit firm tenure. 
We found no support that discretionary accruals are lower in the earlier years of 
firm tenure. For the model, FT (firm tenure) is not significant. The model suggest 
that there is no association between long audit tenure and audit quality.  
  
ŒCONOMICA 
 193 
Table 1. Regression Results for Modified Jones Model 
Variables Coefficient t-value p-value 
Experimental Variable    
   FT -,058 -,770 ,442 
Control Variables    
   OPINION -,149 -2,044 ,042 
   BIG 4 -,115 -1,444 ,150 
   SIZE ,048 ,634 ,527 
Constant  1,812 ,072 
Adj. R2 ,018   
Dependent Variable: DA  
The results of Larcker and Richardson Model presented in Table 2 shows that there 
is a negative and significant relationship between FT (firm tenure) and audit quality 
on the level of discretionary accruals. This finding reveals that audit quality 
increases with long audit firm years. The results suggest that familiarity helps to 
produce higher audit quality.  
Table 2. Regression Results for Larcker and Richardson Model 
Variables Coefficient t-value p-value 
Experimental Variable    
   FT -,136 -,1845 ,067 
Control Variables    
   OPINION -,258 -3,617 ,000 
   BIG 4 -,056 ,716 ,475 
   SIZE ,012 -,167 ,868 
Constant  1,883 ,061 
Adj. R2 ,059   
Dependent Variable: DA 
Table 3 shows the results of logistics regression between FT (firm tenure) and audit 
quality, when proxied by the propensity to issue a modified audit opinion. The 
model does not find significant relationship between audit firm rotation and audit 
quality. Therefore, we found no evidence of reduced audit quality for longer audit 
firm tenures.  
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Table 3. Regression Results for Modified Opinions 
Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. 
Experimental 
Variable 
    
   FT -,112 ,143 ,613 ,434 
Control Variables     
   BIG 4 ,532 ,517 1,059 ,303 
   SIZE ,000 ,000 3,454 ,063 
Constant -1,345 ,682 3,892 ,048 
Dependent Variable: OPINION 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the relationship between audit firm tenure and audit quality 
for non-financial traded companies in Turkey. Using three proxies of audit quality, 
we found some evidence that there is an increase in audit quality conditional on the 
length of audit firm tenure in Turkey. This finding suggest that audit quality does 
not deteriorate with audit firm tenure or audit quality increases when a new audit 
firm is retained. According to this results we can conclude that Turkish capital 
market will not benefit from mandatory audit firm rotation.  
The examination of multiple proxies of audit quality provides greater confidence in 
the relationship between audit quality and audit firm tenure. In addition, we suggest 
that other initiatives such as more effective quality control or penalizing activities 
by the oversight board may need to be considered to address concerns about audit 
quality. Future research may investigate the relationship between audit quality and 
mandatory partner rotation in Turkey. 
Our results should be interpreted cautiously as our study is subject to several 
limitations. First, the maximum audit engagement length in our sample is limited to 
seven years since there have been a mandatory audit-firm rotation regime in 
Turkey since 2010. Therefore we were unable to show the potential impact of long-
term audit tenure on our empirical results.  
Despite the application of mandatory audit-firm rotation in Turkey since 2010, the 
relation between audit firm tenure and audit quality has received little attention in 
academic research. We believe that our findings add to the growing body of 
literature on mandatory audit firm rotation. The results of this study will be useful 
for the regulators (POA) to improve the audit quality in Turkey.  
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